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Basic Documents and Case Law 2003-2004, Compiled by the ICTR Library, 
Laity Kama Law Library Collection. CD Rom  $US 50.00 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/library/cdrom_no3.pdf  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by 
the United Nations in 1994 to address the genocide that took place in Rwanda. 
The tribunal began its work in 1995 under Judge Laity Kama, the first 
president of the ICTR. The tribunal’s rules, decisions, and case files from 
1995-2000 were made available to the public on a CD-ROM in 2001.  
Another CD-ROM followed with a compilation of ICTR documents from 
2001-2002.  Basic Documents and Case Law 2003-2004 continues this 
important historical record of the ground-breaking work of the tribunal.  
Basic Documents and Case Law includes an introduction to the ICTR, 
Basic Documents, Cases, United Nations Documents, ICTR Documents, and 
Help materials. In addition, there is a brief preface explaining the work of the 
tribunal and a tribute to Judge Kama, for whom the collection is named. The 
materials are presented in both English and French.  
The hundreds of pages in the Basic Documents collection begin with 
PDF copies of the 1994 UN Statute of the International Tribunal with all its 
amendments through 2004.  The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence from 
1995 as amended through 2004 are presented in PDF or Word formats. Rules 
and regulations spanning 1998 through 2004 covering court administration, 
codes of conduct for the prosecution and defense, assignment of prosecution 
and defense counsel, and rules governing detainees pending trial round out the 
Basic Documents.  
The compilation of 58 Cases “contains legal documents relating to the 
trials held between 2003 -2004.”  The amount of material depends on the 
status of the case. Some trials initiated in 2003-2004 contain indictments and 
a handful of procedural documents. Others lack the indictment and early 
filings, but document the procedural maneuvering over witnesses, evidence, 
and scheduling. Some trial folders encompass the complete trial up to the 
judgment.  All documents are in PDF and most have official court stamps and 
handwritten notations.   
The UN resolutions and reports regarding the ICTR are assembled for 
easy access, as would be expected. The ICTR publications such as the15 
speeches by judges and others, and the quarterly law library acquisition lists 
appear to be of historical value rather than legal value.  
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Any digital compilation of materials is only as good as its search 
feature. Fortunately, the ICTR collection has a search interface that allows 
searching in a number of effective ways. The researcher can search by free 
text (terms within the full text) or by keyword (controlled vocabulary). Simple 
Boolean operators “and” and “or” can be employed to enhance the search 
query. Material can also be searched by six categories:  Accused, Case 
Number, Articles (statutes), Rules, Document Type, Fixed Date, and Date 
Range. The search function has an excellent Help page with clear instructions 
should a researcher get confused, which would be highly unlikely. 
Although the CD has valuable information, is this the best medium 
for disseminating and preserving the Rwanda genocide trials material? The 
trial materials on the CD are not cumulative so a complete picture of the case 
requires retrospective collecting.  The CD format is “old” technology in 
today’s digital environment. Libraries collecting CDs will likely transfer the 
material into a digital format sooner rather than later. Finally, the key ICTR 
documents are available online on the Internet Site of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda http://196.45.185.38/default.htm  The site is 
well-organized and presents trials, rules, articles and internal court documents 
from 1994 to 2006 plus more. The web site has a greater pool of information 
for the researcher but unlike the CD, is subject to the vagaries of internet 
servers and is not necessarily portable. 
The CD would be valuable to any academic library wanting to 
maintain a physical collection of human rights materials. It would also be 
useful to the international practitioner dealing with UN tribunals in Rwanda 
and elsewhere.   
 
Jean M. Callihan 
Head of Research Services and Lecturer in Law 
Cornell Law Library 
 Ithaca, NY USA 
 
 
European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety. By Christopher Hodges. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xxiii, 310. ISBN 0-
19-928255-2. £64.95; US$125.00. 
 
 Dr. Christopher Hodges is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for 
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, and a consultant with CMS 
Cameron McKenna.  Hodges’ book, which has its roots in his doctoral 
dissertation, examines the European Union legislation that regulates the safety 
of consumer products.  He compares various mechanisms relating to 
medicinal products, cosmetics, biocides, tobacco products, consumer 
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products, and products covered by European Community Directive 
2001/95/EEC or “New Approach Directive”, and seeks to find out why there 
is a lack of uniform application of such mechanisms to every consumer 
product.  Throughout the book, Hodges argues for more consistency in 
regulatory enforcement and oversight as well as for more systematic 
collection of safety data.  Because of space limitations, certain related sectors 
such as motor vehicles, foodstuffs, aerospace products, workplace health and 
safety and environmental control, are excluded.    
In chapter one, which focuses on the theoretical aspects of regulation, 
Hodges reviews the general theories of regulation that underpin the social 
policy behind the reviewed laws. He carefully examines the economic 
arguments for safety regulation and the cost-benefit analysis of safety as well 
as briefly discussing the theory of social regulation. Although he does a 
credible job of mapping out the various parts of his book, which follow a solid 
logical pattern, the chapter shortchanges the readers who are not familiar with 
the working social policies of regulation. Each introductory chapter for the 
three parts of his book follows this pattern. 
The next five chapters of the book make up the Part I entitled 
“Description of the Main Regulatory Systems at Community Level.” They 
outline the essential structure of the European Community’s product 
regulatory legislation. Chapter two contains only five pages, as the author 
races through the list of EC Directives regulating various products by listing 
them in a table.  This brief chapter also outlines what chapters three through 
six cover. Hodges is meticulous in his outline, but provides little substance in 
the beginning of this book.  
Part II of the book entitled “Procedural Mechanism for Safety” 
contains the next eight chapters.  This portion of the book analyzes the 
consumer product design; pre-market assessment requirements; control of the 
manufacturing environment and process; post-marketing requirements on 
producers, distributors, and authorities; and requirements of users.  Hodge’s 
objective is to analyze the following points: 1) the purpose and nature of each 
procedural mechanism technique to ensure product safety; 2) what pieces of 
legislation correspond to each procedural technique; 3) the examination of 
those who bear ultimate obligations for such procedures; and 4) the 
effectiveness of each technique in ensuring safety. Each chapter makes 
excellent use of supporting legislative documentation and provides a useful, if 
not familiar critique, of the procedural mechanism for safety, from its 
theoretical basis to its implementation stages. This section of the book is 
strong because it makes excellent use of data as well as available legislation to 
ensure that the readers arrive at the same conclusion as the author. 
Nevertheless, each chapter suffers from the “individual essay” syndrome. 
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Instead of blending together, each chapter may be read as an individual essay 
with little or no connection to the chapter following it.  
Part III of the book is entitled “Theoretical Issues and Conclusions” 
and it contains chapters 16 to19.  Chapter 16 is an outline of the following 
chapters, where the Hodges reiterates what he has covered in the first two 
parts and explains what the last three chapters cover. Chapter 17 critically 
analyzes the actors involved in the EC regulatory process. Hodge takes the 
readers through the various legality tests as they apply to the regulatory 
process in the European Community. Moreover, he carefully explains the 
uniqueness of the system found in its intricate system of committees, 
centralized agencies, member state authorities, and interest groups.  He 
concludes that the current system does not either produce or enhance product 
safety, and thus a single EC Safety Agency should be constructed to better 
achieve the goal of consumer product safety. Chapter 18 deals with the 
meaning of safety and risk in the context of consumer products. Hodges 
delves deeply into the theory of risk while explaining the politics of consumer 
confidence. He ultimately argues that even though there is no consensus on 
risk-acceptability criteria, there must be better public understanding of the 
need for uniform standards for risk and safety when it comes to consumer 
products.  The final chapter contains Hodge’s conclusions about the 
complexity of materials covered and draws Hodges’ conclusions together to a 
concise and reasoned end. 
 Dr. Hodges’ work is a critical analysis of the current body of EC law 
and legislation on the broad topic of consumer product regulation. The book is 
well researched and exquisitely cited so to provide its readers with a quick 
reference to the most pertinent case law holdings and legislation in this 
growing area of law. This book, however, reads more like a compilation of 
individual essays rather than a cohesive, free flowing text. The text contains a 
large table of cases, a thorough table of legislation, and a table of legislation, 
which is necessary in any EU law text.  The cited cases and legislation 
originate from EU countries as well as from North America and Australia. 
The book is not conventionally organized, and it lacks the cohesive 
organization of a classic textbook. Nevertheless, its exquisite analysis of a 
difficult regulatory area warrants a recommendation for law schools that offer 
comparative law courses or courses in European Union law. 
 
Dragomir Cosanici 
Head of Information Services 
Ruth Lilly Law Library 
Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis 
Indianapolis, IN USA 
        




Public Policy and Law in Russia: In Search of a Unified Legal and Political 
Space: Essays in Honor of Donald D. Barry. (Law in Eastern Europe; No. 
55). Edited by Robert Sharlet and Ferdinand Feldbrugge. Leiden; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. Pp. xii, 318. ISBN 90-04-14916-3. 
€120.00; $162.00. 
 
The fourteen essays in this book deal with political and legal issues 
spanning the era from the demise of the Soviet Union into President Putin’s 
first term of office. Specific topics covered are the center/periphery conflicts, 
the court system, the procuracy, land legislation, the criminal procedure code, 
the advocates’ bar, religious freedom, and foreign policy. The inevitable 
overlap between essays serves as useful reinforcement rather than as a 
distraction. 
The contributors to the collection are legal scholars and political 
scientists, several of whom contributed to earlier volumes in this series, which 
is issued by the Institute of East European Law and Russian Studies of the 
Faculty of Law of Leiden University. In the Preface, George Ginsburgs 
(Rutgers University) and Oles Smolanskey (Lehigh University), who are 
themselves noted scholars of Soviet law and politics, write that Prof. Barry, to 
whom the book is dedicated, was not only a pioneer in the study of Soviet 
politics and law, with particular emphasis on governmental tort liability, but 
also a leading authority on administrative law in general. 
The search for unity referred to in the title refers most obviously to 
the discord between the central government and the various republics and 
regions of the Russian Federation that confronted President Putin upon 
assuming office. Several essays address this situation explicitly, and it is 
referred to in others as well. Taken together, the essays vividly convey the 
fragmentation of the Russian Federation, with thousands, if not tens of 
thousands, of local laws in variance with each other and in contradiction to 
federal laws, and of regional constitutions or charters in conflict with that of 
the federal constitution. They describe President Putin’s measures in early 
2000 to harmonize and standardize laws by announcing a “dictatorship of 
law,” creating seven federal districts, and sending presidential envoys and 
deputy prosecutor-generals throughout the Federation to try to bring order to 
the situation. All the commentators point out that even after some initial 
success, much remained to be done. Indeed, even as this review is being 
written, newspapers have pointed out that the Tatarstan constitution is still not 
compatible with that of the Russian Federation. 
The first essay, “Post-Soviet Constitutional Systems,” by Ferdinand 
Feldbrugge (Leiden University) compares features of the constitutions of the 
countries that emerged form the break-up of the Soviet Union. In “Bilateral 
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Compacts in Russian Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Ger van den Berg 
(Leiden University), deals with the complicated legal status of the bilateral 
legal agreements that were concluded by the central government with various 
federation states under President Yeltsin and led to the confusing situation in 
the first place. Van den Berg also traces the interesting, but fruitless attempts 
by the Russian Federation to sign a bilateral compact with Chechnya. 
The theme of the intransigence of the sub-national units is the focus 
of Prof. Sharlet’s essay, “Resistance to Putin’s Campaign for Political and 
Legal Unification.” Prof. Sharlet points out how difficult a job it is to 
standardize laws, even when parties agree to do so, because one law can 
create a ripple effect through the entire body of law. While providing vivid 
examples of the resistance by wily regional officials to the harmonization 
campaign, the conclusion to his essay is optimistic, as he points out that the 
conflicts were on a civilized plane and that parties often turned to courts, 
which served to strengthen the idea of rule of law. However, in the epilogue 
to his original essay, Prof. Sharlet brings up President Putin’s loss of patience 
with regional leaders, and how, using the 2004 Beslan tragedy as pretext, he 
set about the appointment of regional governors by the central government. 
The theme of center-regional conflicts is also a major them in “Public 
Land Ownership” by Peter Maggs (University of Illinois), as he traces the 
convoluted history of how the central government, early in the Yeltsin 
presidency, gave jurisdiction to public lands to the sub-national entities under 
the Federation Treaty, but then later, bolstered by Constitutional Court 
decisions, began attempts to take them back. Maggs brings up thorny 
problems of joint jurisdiction, as well as many other examples of complex 
issues relating to the allocation of public lands that are not addressed, he feels, 
in the hastily and poorly drafted land legislation that exists so far. Another 
perspective on federalism is provided in “Local Self-Government and the 
Unification of Political Space in Novgorod,” a case study of the Novgorod 
region by Nicolai Petro (University of Rhode Island), who provides a history 
of the determined attempts of that region to attain a measure of atonomy 
under the leadership of an energetic, galvanizing governor. 
One of the most important legislative enactments of the early Putin 
years was a new Criminal Procedure Code, which came into effect in July 
2002. Several essays dealing with this topic bring out that there was bitter 
opposition to the incorporation of what were considered Western standards 
into the Russian criminal system. In his essay, “Putin, the Procuracy and the 
Criminal Code,” Prof. Gordon Smith (Univ. of South Carolina), emphasizes 
in particular the procuracy’s resistance to the new code as it weakened their 
powers vis-à-vis the courts in criminal proceedings. In “Consensual Justice in 
Russia: Guilty Pleas under the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code,” Stanislaw 
Pomorski gives a crisp account of one of the most innovative parts of the new 
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Criminal Procedure Code, namely, the rendering of verdicts and imposition of 
sentences without a trial if the defendant consents, which is based on the non-
contestation of charges rather than proof of guilt. Among his concerns is the 
fear that some defendants might acquiesce to the procedure just to escape 
from the notoriously bad conditions of the detention centers to the less harsh 
penal colonies. He also points out that poorly paid appointed defense 
advocates might coerce their indigent clients into accepting the procedure just 
to avoid the time-consuming work on criminal cases. In his epilogue, 
Pomorski points to the increased use of this special procedure, from less than 
one percent of all criminal cases in 2002 to over 20 percent in 2003. 
In “The Founding of Chambers of Advocates in Putin’s Russia,” 
Eugene Huskey (Stetson University) deals with the implementation of the 
2002 Law on Advocates. In eliminating local chambers of advocates and 
creating a single Chamber of Advocates for each federation unit, this law 
responded to President Putin’s desire to streamline administrative structure 
and curb the proliferation of chambers after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Touching on Pomorski’s concern about the ability of poorly-paid advocates to 
defend indigent clients, Huskey fears that this burden will discourage the 
development of an innovative and independent profession. 
“Russia’s Constitutional Court and Human Rights,” by Irina Lediakh 
(Russian Academy of Sciences) overlaps significantly with the essays by 
Smith and Pomorksi in focusing on various aspects of criminal procedure and 
the procuracy’s bitter opposition to the new code. Lediakh points out that 
during its first ten years, 30 of the Constitutional Court’s decisions concerned 
criminal procedure and that the majority of them were in favor of securing the 
rights of persons. She empasizes how carefully the Court attempts to adhere to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, but points out that there still exist 
problems regarding implementation of decisions of the Court. 
Using persuasive statistics, two essays focus on the increasing role of 
courts in settling disputes. In “Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of 
Administrative Justice,” Peter Solomon (University of Toronto), documents 
how the Law on Citizens’ Complaints of 1993 gave impetus to citizens to 
bring suits against officials. It is interesting, in light of Smiths’s account of the 
procuracy’s insistence on retaining their powers to review citizens’ 
complaints, that courts of general jurisdiction have ruled in favor of citizens, 
while in procuracy courts the percentage of favorable decisions has been 
much lower. Solomon attributes this to the fact that the procuracy courts are 
usually used by poorer persons since there is no fee, which makes bringing 
frivolous cases easier. Solomon concludes that all this activity of going to 
court is beneficial in increasing respect for the judicial system court, and the 
fact that courts have ruled so consistently against the state is a substantial 
achievement. 
596 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 34.3 
 
 
Katherine Hendley’s essay, “Making Sense of Business Litigation in 
Russia,” which is based on field work, deals with a selected number disputes 
brought to arbitrazh courts located in Moscow, Saratov, and Ekaterinburg. 
Pointing to the relatively small sums involved in the disputes between 
enterprises, Hendley points out that amounts that seem trivial to an American 
reader can be monumental to a small Russian enterprise teetering on the verge 
of bankruptcy. She explains that one motivation for going to court is that 
having court proof of debt assures tax officials that claiming debts is not just a 
ploy to pay fewer taxes. Hendley was impressed with the fairness and 
discipline of the judges in arbitrazh courts but dismayed by the poor quality 
of lawyers, although she thinks that those in 2001 were better than the ones 
she had observed earlier. 
In his essay “Religious Human Rights: Constitution, Law, and 
Practice in Post-Soviet Russia,” Peter Juviler (Barnard College) focuses on 
the Law on Freedom of Conscience of 1997, which President Yeltsin 
reluctantly signed after repeated earlier rejections. This law recognized the 
special role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian society, and, in direct 
contravention of the Constitution, took away most of the rights of religious 
groups that could not prove that they had been in Russia for 15 years before 
the law’s passage. Juviler points out that in a huge, multi-ethnic country like 
Russia the unifying force of one traditional religion does have special appeal. 
However, he points out that advocates for religious rights have won victories 
in ordinary courts as well as the Constitutional Court. 
In one of the two essays that deal with international matters, 
“Russia’s Law Against Trade in People,” Louise Shelley (American 
University) emphasizes the important role of women’s groups and the 
influence of international documents on the drafting of the law. In “Russia’s 
Practice in the UN Security Council,” John Quigley (University of Ohio) 
points out that the end of the Cold War brought about a fundamental change 
in the way that Russia/USSR re-acted to the use of force by the United States. 
The Soviet stance was to challenge routinely the facts on which the United 
States presented as justification for its actions. Examining, the votes on such 
issues as Kosovo and the Afghanistan intervention after Sept.11, 2001, Prof. 
Quigley concludes that Russia’s response is now much less predictable and 
often self-contradictory, depending on vagaries of domestic politics. 
The book contains some odd editorial lapses.  However, the wealth of 
information contained in these generally meticulously documented essays, as 
well as the useful introductory and concluding chapters, make it a very useful 
addition to academic libraries that try to keep up with the evolution of law and 
politics in the Russian Federation. 
 
  Lucy Cox 
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International and foreign Law Librarian 
Rutgers University Law Library 
Camden, NJ USA 
 
 
Law and the Legal System of the Russian Federation, 3rd ed.  By William 
Burnham, Peter B. Maggs, and Gennady M. Danilenko. Huntington, New 
York: Juris Publishing, 2005.  Pp. 700.  ISBN 1-57823-197-3.  US$120.00 
 
If you are looking for one book in English to provide an overview of 
the contemporary Russian legal system, this is it.  The volume provides 
narrative and cases on all major areas of Russian law.  Although written with 
law students in mind, the book is extremely valuable to practitioners and 
scholars as well.  It contains translated excerpts from recent landmark and 
illustrative cases, a copy of the 1993 Constitution, extensive references to 
scholarly literature and international reports on the Russian legal system, and 
a topical index.     
The book’s authors bring rich experience to their task, having edited 
two previous versions of the text.  The principal author, Professor Burnham, 
teaches Russian law at Wayne State University Law School and has been 
actively involved in Russian law reform activities.  Professor Maggs of the 
University of Illinois College of Law is recognized as one the world’s leading 
scholars on Russian law.  The late Professor Danilenko, affiliated with the 
Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law and with Wayne 
State Law School, died prematurely in 2001.   
The book is divided into fourteen chapters.  The first half outlines the 
fundamentals of the Russian legal system: its sources of law, the structure of 
the judicial system and of the legal profession, constitutional law, and the 
applicable law on individual rights.  The second half of the book reviews the 
substance and procedure of civil, criminal, administrative, tax, and private 
international law.  While the book is not comprehensive, it provides an 
excellent introduction to these topics with references that will guide the reader 
looking for more in-depth coverage.  The book’s table of contents is available 
at http://www.jurispub.com/books.asp?id=96.  The book will be especially 
useful to those teaching courses on Russian or comparative law as each 
chapter contains extensive questions and notes to provoke thought and 
discussion. 
  This volume is unique in the breadth of its review of the Russian legal 
system and in its inclusion of numerous excerpts of Russian judicial decisions 
and other important sources of law.  For instance, in its chapter on 
constitutional law, it includes excerpts from the 1992 decision of the Russian 
Constitutional Court on the legality of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
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Union.  In the chapter on individual rights, it includes excerpts from the 2002 
European Court of Human Rights’ decision, Kalashnikov v. Russia, on 
conditions of detention in Russia.  These cases give a flavor for Russian law 
and justice that text alone simply cannot.  
As the authors point out, the contemporary Russian legal system is 
evolving in a context where “the rule of law remains a challenge for the future 
rather than a present-day reality.”  They note in the preface the limits of law 
and legal systems. They state, “[t]he necessary change in basic legal cultural 
attitudes will take a long time.  But the current laws and legal system of 
Russia are a first step down that road.”  This book elucidates the first step and 
points the way to additional sources for those who want to understand the 
Russian legal system further. 
 
   Mary Holland 
Director, LL.M. Lawyering Program 
NYU Law School 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
Ruling Russia: Law, Crime, and Justice in a Changing Society.  Edited by 
William Alex Pridemore.  Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005.  Pp. xii, 325.  ISBN: 0-7425-3675-0.  US$85.00. 
 
Profound changes have battered Russia in the past fifteen years, 
forcing it to jettison Communist politics, government, and economy, and to 
create nascent democratic and market-oriented structures.  This extremely 
useful volume analyzes how this wide-ranging transition influences Russian 
criminal law and justice.  William A. Pridemore, the editor, intends to fill a 
void in the literature about how overwhelming social change 
affects the rule of law.  He has succeeded admirably by providing thirteen 
provocative essays that discuss Russian law, crime, and the criminal justice 
system, together with a thoughtful introduction and conclusion distilling the 
book’s themes.    
Professor Pridemore, an assistant professor of criminal justice at 
Indiana University, prepared this edition while a fellow at the Harvard Davis 
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.  He coordinated twenty-two scholars 
from diverse disciplines and perspectives to contribute essays.  The result is a 
unique collection of chapters from scholars in Russia, the United States, and 
Europe on overlapping topics of law, crime, and justice in Russia.  While the 
text presumes an informed reader, it does not presume an expert one.  The 
volume will be useful to Russian law scholars and to those studying the 
processes of government and economic transition more generally.    
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Pridemore has divided the book into three sections.  The first section, 
on law, provides an overview of the new Russian state structure, including 
chapters on the federal legislature and its political parties, the Presidency, the 
judiciary, and the recently revised Criminal Procedure Code.  These chapters 
provide the framework for the remaining two sections on crime and the 
response of the criminal justice system.  The second section, on crime, 
contains a vast amount of information about the nature of the Russian clan 
state, patterns of violent crime, and the new problems of human trafficking 
and illegal drug trade.  The final section, on the criminal justice system, 
reflects on the government’s response to the skyrocketing HIV/AIDS 
population, juvenile crime, police abuses, and the antiquated correctional 
system.  The book also contains detailed bibliographic references, a topical 
index, and information about each of the contributors.  Its table of contents is 
available online at http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com.  
Professor Pridemore’s conclusion, “Whither Russia: Transition or 
Turmoil?” summarizes a theme common to all the essays, which is that the 
criminal justice system is in fact teetering between transition and turmoil.  
While it is too soon to foretell the ultimate outcome of Russia’s most recent 
revolution, Professor Pridemore concludes that “[t]he contributors’ outlooks 
for the future in their respective areas are not positive.”  This book provides 
an excellent resource for understanding the changes occurring now, and those 




Director, LL.M. Lawyering Program 
NYU Law School 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
Access to Information in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of 
EC and Member State Legislation. By H. Kranenborg and W. Voermans. 
Groningen, The Netherlands: Europa Law Publishing, 2005. Pp. 129. ISBN: 
9076871469. €36.00, US$65.00. 
 
Access to Information in the European Union:  A Comparative 
Analysis of EC and Member State Legislation is, as the title implies, a survey 
of the national legislation of EU member states regarding access to 
information.  However, as the authors, Kranenborg and Voermans, state in the 
preface to the book, a second and "more academic" aim of the book is to 
"assess what conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the EC and 
member state legislation."  In relation to this second aim, the authors promise 
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to address two questions: Are there any general differences between the “old” 
and the “new” member states? And secondly, is the EU more or less 
transparent than the “average” member state? 
The book is divided into three parts in an attempt to fulfill these aims.  
In Part I, the authors concisely (in only three pages) provide an introduction to 
the work.  The introduction discusses the methodology and scope of the 
research as well as the terminology and structure of the book.  Part II of the 
book contains a limited comparative analysis of the EU and member states’ 
legislation.  Part III, which constitutes ninety-nine of the one-hundred and 
twenty-nine pages of the book, provides the survey of EU and member state 
legislation.  In the survey, the authors attempt to identify the legislation and 
describe its scope as well as to address exceptions to free access, procedural 
rules and institutional structures involved in accessing information, and legal 
or administrative remedies available to contest denial of access.      
Although Part III, containing the survey information, is the lengthiest 
part of the book, for a number of reasons it nonetheless falls short of 
providing an adequate survey.  First, the authors fail to include in the survey 
information regarding two EU member states, Luxembourg and Cyprus.  The 
reason that information about these two states is omitted is initially unclear.  
The authors do state that Malta is one of three nations without legislation in 
the field of access to information; however, they do not disclose the names of 
the other two states.  Only upon a visit to the electronic version of the survey, 
is it stated, "[o]f Cyprus and Luxembourg no legislation on access to 
information is known."1  
Further, the survey is incomplete because it is too limited in scope.  
The scope of the study did not include examination of legislation pertaining to 
either environmental or personal information. A complete picture of a state’s 
commitment to transparency cannot be developed absent an examination of 
these two essential components of access.  Both Luxembourg and Cypress 
have legislation pertaining to personal data.2  If indeed these two states were 
omitted from the survey because they did not have legislation regarding 
access, a more inclusive definition of the types of legislation that affect access 
would likely have resulted in inclusion of information on these two states.  
Similarly, national implementing legislation regarding human rights is not 
addressed by the survey.  The authors do briefly discuss human rights in 
regards to Malta.  The survey of Maltese law specifically mentions the 
                                                 
1 Universiteit Leiden, Transparency in Europe, 
http://www.transparencyineurope.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?m=3&c=5&garb=0.3219
25627859382&session=  
2For instance both states have laws regulating the processing of personal data.  
Links to those laws are provided by the European Commission at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm   
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European Convention Act of 1987 that implements the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  Thus, it is apparent that the 
authors recognize the influence of human rights on access legislation; 
however, they have so limited the scope of the survey that it does not permit 
the authors to provide an adequate picture of the environment regarding 
access within individual nations.   
An alternative publication for those interested in the Human Rights 
component of access to information is Human Rights in the Global 
Information Society.   This title, edited by Rikke Frank Jørgenson, is not only 
more recent, it also discusses both the legislation and application of access 
laws with a worldwide emphasis.  Further, in David Banisar's contribution to 
Human Rights in the Global Information Society, Banisar references another 
web-based work to which he has contributed.3  This work, available at 
http://www.freedominfo.org/, is a survey of national laws of sixty-five states, 
although unfortunately neither Luxembourg nor Cyprus is included.  This 
web-based survey is also significantly more inclusive than Kranenborg and 
Voermans’, taking into account environmental, personal data, criminal, and 
human rights legislation.  Additionally, Banisar’s survey appears to be 
updated on an annual basis to ensure that it does not become obsolete.   
As previously mentioned, Kranenborg and Voermans have similarly 
placed Part III of their book on the web.  The web version of Part III states 
that hyperlinks are provided to European and national legislation and to other 
web-based literature. These hyperlink references are said to have been 
accurate as of May 2005.  However, there is no indication that the authors 
plan to update the resource when new legislation is enacted.   Nor is there 
evidence that the hyperlinks provided will be updated.  In fact, some of the 
hyperlinks have already become inactive.  As a result, it is likely that the 
Kranenborg and Voermans site will quickly become obsolete.  
Finally, the Kranenborg and Voermans survey appears to be 
incomplete, because some prominent legislation may not have been identified.  
The authors readily admit that because they could not "in most cases … delve 
into national practice" they "probably did not always succeed in pinpointing 
the most prominent provisions."  
The circumstances under which this book was prepared suggest that 
time may have been a factor that influenced the researchers to accept a less 
than fully complete survey.  The authors explain that the work was 
"commissioned" in September 2004 and had to be completed prior to the EU 
Conference on Transparency in Europe II that was held in November 2004.  
                                                 
3 David Banisar, The Right to Information in the Age of Information, in Human 
Rights in the Global Information Society 86 (Rikke Frank Jørgenson ed., 2006), citing 
to Freedominfo.org, http://www.freedominfo.org  
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As a result, the authors characterize the publication only as an "initial 
inventory" and invite readers to send comments and suggestions to improve 
the research. 
In regards to the second aim of making comparisons and drawing 
conclusions, it is difficult to accomplish such a task without complete 
information.  In a somewhat apologetic tone, the authors appear to recognize 
that the incomplete survey of legislation is not an adequate basis on which to 
draw reliable conclusions.  For example, they write, "[c]ase law on the 
practical application of the law is generally not accessible in English.  
Additionally, and in many cases statistical facts are not obtainable.  For these 
reasons the survey and analysis with regard to Member States are theoretical 
in nature.  Naturally, that effectiveness of access to information laws can only 
be determined through their practical application."4   
Apparently prompted, in part, by their previous promise to answer 
specific questions, and notwithstanding the difficulty caused by the 
incomplete information, the authors nonetheless make an attempt at providing 
some meaningful analysis and conclusions.  However, additional difficulties 
contribute to the authors' lack of success in providing meaningful analysis.  
First, the authors fail to fully define the terms of their inquiry.   While the 
work purports to draw distinctions between "old" and "new" states, the 
authors do not, in either the terminology section of Part I or in the two and 
one-half pages of the concluding observations of Part II, explain how states 
were categorized as “old" and "new" for purposes of the analysis.  As a result, 
readers are left to their own assumptions that "old" states include the original 
six founding countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands) as well as those states that became members between 1973 
and 1995.  Similarly, a reasonable assumption is that the "new states" are 
those ten accession countries that joined the EU in 2004.  Given that the work 
was initially prepared to assist Conference attendees, perhaps the authors 
assumed that this sophisticated audience would make assumptions similar to 
their own.   
Additionally the authors conclude that perhaps "the only possible 
conclusion is that at a general level these laws are predominantly similar."  
Rather than making further specific analysis, the authors instead refer to an 
interesting overview of the three perceived traditions of access to information 
posed by the Estonian representative to the EU Conference on Transparency 
in Europe II, the conference for which the publication was initially prepared.   
                                                 
4 The survey information for some states does include links to NGOs that are 
monitoring the practical application of the laws.  For instance, information is provided 
regarding NGOs that monitor application in Latvia and the United Kingdom are 
provided.   
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While I found this brief discussion interesting, it does not substitute for a 
conclusion by the authors. Similarly, the authors' conclusions regarding the 
comparison of EU transparency with the "average member state" is also 
somewhat disappointing. With scant rationale, the authors' conclude that if 
placed in a ranking of transparency with the EU member states, the EU would 
be ranked somewhere in the middle. 
Given the incomplete and limited nature of the survey, which 
constitutes a majority of the book, as well as the fact that the survey is 
available online, it is difficult to conceive what type of library might desire to 
include the reviewed publication in its collection.  The limited nature of the 
analysis further restricts the usefulness of the publication.  Further, the 
availability of more current and expansive information on the topic from other 
sources limits the usefulness of this text.  Perhaps those interested in 
maintaining a comprehensive collection, including historical information on 
the topic of access to information within the specific geographic region 
encompassed by the European Union would find acquisition of the text to be 
worthwhile.5 
 
Darla W. Jackson 
Reference Librarian 
Oklahoma City University Law Library 
Oklahoma City, OK USA 
 
 
Law in the War on International Terrorism. Edited By Ved P. Nanda. 
Ardsley NY: Transnational Publishers, 2005. Pp. xiv, 288. ISBN 1-57105-
319-0. US$115.00 
 
 In the post-September 11th world, the war on terrorism has become an 
important topic of discussion and analysis. Terrorism and the measures taken 
by nations to combat it comprise a multi-faceted subject that can be examined 
from a variety of perspectives.  Law in the War on International Terrorism 
explores the topic from a legal point of view. Stemming from a conference on 
international terrorism held by the University of Denver’s International Legal 
Studies Program, this book is an edited volume with chapters written by law 
professors and practicing attorneys. It delves into many aspects of the subject 
in order to “provide a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the pertinent 
                                                 
5 Perhaps there are a number of libraries that include this type of collection.  
According to the OCLC World Catalog over eighty-five libraries worldwide have 
included this book in their collections.  
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domestic, bilateral, regional and international legal developments in the war 
against terrorism.”   
  The fight against terrorism is certainly not new; it was not born after 
the World Trade Center fell. Historically, there have been many international 
conventions and agreements that have condemned terrorist acts, including 
hijacking, hostage taking, and terrorist bombing, and there have been others 
that have attempted to suppress the financing of terrorist.  In the first chapter 
of the book, “Terrorism, International Law and International Organizations,” 
Ved P. Nanda describes the United States’ and the United Nations’ anti-
terrorism activities before September 11th.  According to Mr. Nanda, one of 
the key problems has been that there was no general consensus in the 
international community about the definition of “terrorism” or “terrorist act.” 
As a result of this fact, it had been difficult to create a comprehensive 
convention against terrorism.  
Chapter One proceeds to detail the post-September 11th response by 
the United Nations, the United States, and a number of regional organizations. 
The U.N. Security Council “affirmatively found terrorism to be a threat to 
international peace and security” and adopted Resolution 1373 [U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/1373 (2001)], which “established new international legal obligations on 
states to take specific measures and to cooperate against terrorism.” While the 
author states that there is still no official international definition of 
“terrorism,” he points out that the focus of post-September 11th actions by the 
U.N. General Assembly has been towards the completion of comprehensive 
conventions relating to international terrorism and to acts of nuclear terrorism. 
Expanding on this, in Chapter Two, Peter Kovacs provides a more extensive 
look at the United Nations’ actions in the fight against international terrorism.  
 In Chapter Three, James A.R. Nafziger explains what he calls the 
“Grave New World of Terrorism,” with appropriate references to Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World. He briefly discusses the root causes of terrorism 
and attempts to provide a clear understanding of key concepts, such as 
“terrorism,” “war,” and “prisoner of war,” in the present world context. Mr. 
Nafziger introduces the topic of the detention of terrorists and the process by 
which they can or should be tried. Chapter Four further develops the 
discussion of what is war by introducing the concepts of “lawful war” and 
“unlawful war.” Mary Ellen O’Connell presents an analysis of the legal bases 
and justification necessary for a nation to use force and invade another 
sovereign nation, in the context of the United States’ invasions of both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Chapter Five, written by Larry D. Johnson, introduces the topic of the 
threat of nuclear terrorism and then surveys nations’ responses to that threat.  
After a brief discussion of the different types of radioactive materials, Mr. 
Johnson reviews the bilateral efforts by the United States and Russia to 
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protect nuclear materials and facilities and then describes the current efforts to 
produce international conventions relating to nuclear terrorism.  
In Chapter Six, Claude d’Estree and Luke Andrew Busby analyze 
Title III of the USA Patriot Act, which contains the money laundering and 
anti-terrorist financing provisions. The majority of the chapter is a detailed 
discussion of specific sections of the act, such as transparency in financial 
transactions by international entities doing business in the U.S., expansion of 
the business entities that are required to file Suspicious Activities Reports, 
and the creation of new crimes relating to unauthorized transfer of money. 
The authors conclude with a look at possible unintended consequences of 
Title III.  
Chapters Seven and Eight build on the topic of the detention, legal 
status and trial of terrorists. In Chapter Seven, Neal Richardson and Spencer 
Crona specifically “review the legal underpinnings of the modern incarnation 
and application of military tribunals and explore the practical comparative 
advantages of military tribunals, specifically in respect to trial of accused 
terrorists.” The authors begin by fleshing out the definition of “unlawful 
combatant” as distinguished from “lawful combatant” and “prisoner of war.” 
The chapter, then, addresses whether the president has the constitutional 
authority to establish military commissions, as well as the proper makeup and 
jurisdiction of the commissions, by reviewing the language of the US 
Constitution and of US Supreme Court decisions. Chapter Eight discusses 
military tribunals from both an historical perspective as they have been used 
throughout the world and in the present context in light of post-September 
11th executive orders and legislative enactments. The authors, Robert 
Hardaway, Christopher Hardaway, and James Siegesmund also, “examine the 
underlying constitutionality and statutory authority for such tribunals and 
examine their compatibility with the civil liberties guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.”  
Chapter Nine addresses another business related aspect of the war on 
terrorism, specifically terrorism insurance. Ronald Robinson gives a full 
analysis of the nature of the insurance industry and its response to the claims 
resulting from September 11th. In addition, he provides a discussion of the 
U.S. government’s legislative response and reviews other nations’ terrorism 
insurance protections. Lastly, Mr. Robinson “proposes the creation of a 
specific peril terrorism coverage program that could operate in the United 
States, in other individual countries and on an international (multi-nation) 
scale.” 
Law in the War on International Terrorism is generally well-written 
with a clear presentation and analysis of the issues. The materials are 
thoroughly footnoted and provide excellent resources for further study.  
Certain chapters presume a level of familiarity with the topic. For example, 
606 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 34.3 
 
 
the chapter on terrorism insurance provides a detailed discussion of the 
insurance industry in a way that requires a pre-existing knowledge of the 
material. A negative aspect of the book is that it is poorly copy-edited. There 
are instances of sentences with missing words, of incorrect words being used, 
and at least one case where what is written is not a complete sentence. These 
errors can be a distraction to a reader, because it is sometimes necessary to 
read a sentence multiple times to understand its meaning. However, this 
shortcoming does not take away from the importance of the material 
presented in Law in the War on International Terrorism and should not deter 
people from reading this timely and highly topical book.  
 
   Karin Johnsrud 
Reference Librarian 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law:  A New Source of Inspiration? (UT 
Studies in Foreign and Transnational Law). By  B.S. Markesinis and Jörg 
Fedtke. London: Routledge-Cavendish Publishing, 2006.  Pp. 409.  ISBN 1-
84472-159-0.  £65.00; US$130.00. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent use of foreign law in Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
sparked quite a bit of national debate.  At the crux of the debate are the wildly 
opposing views of sitting Supreme Court justices on the topic.  Justices 
Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer strongly favor use of foreign law in 
constitutional adjudication, and Justice Antonin Scalia vehemently disdains 
use of "alien" sources of law to decide U.S. constitutional law cases.  
Markesinis & Fedtke's book on Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law is 
the latest work to explore use of foreign law by judges.  It stands out from 
other works in the growing literature on the topic by setting forth the 
arguments for and against the use of foreign law not only by U.S. judges, but 
also by judges from other jurisdictions.  The book cites cases from the 
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, Germany, 
South Africa, France, Australia, Cyprus, India, Israel, Namibia, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, along with cases from the U.S., Canada, and the UK.    
In the first six chapters, Markesinis and Fedtke assert that, in the age 
of globalization, judges around the world should engage in cross-national 
conversations and exchange ideas about solutions to common or new 
problems. .  The authors explore why some judges in the U.S., in a globalized 
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and globalizing world, shun "cross-border judicial dialogues.” They argue 
against American exceptionalism, which regards with disfavor participation 
by U.S. judges in the current international dialogue and the use of modern 
foreign law to adjudicate constitutional cases. In particular, Justice Scalia 
proposes the originalist method of constitutional interpretation, which relies 
on the words and meaning of the U.S. Constitution as understood by the 
Founders in the 18th century. 
Markesinis and Fedtke also describe "entry points" for the use of 
foreign law by judges worldwide as a source of inspiration or guidance.  They 
emphasize that they are not discussing use of foreign law as binding precedent 
or in conflict-of-law settings.  Judges can use foreign law to update and 
clarify national law.  With globalization, social changes will occur more 
rapidly and judges will face new problems.  How judges in other countries 
have solved similar legal issues can be eye-opening and informative.  Foreign 
law can inspire judges in their decision-making process. 
Markesinis and Fedtke divide major legal systems into the following 
categories:  "those which do not seem to favour recourse to foreign law [the 
U.S.]...; those who have recourse to it, but do not admit it openly [Italy and 
France]; those which do so openly [England and Germany]; and...those who 
do it not only openly but almost as a regular practice [Canada and South 
Africa]." They carefully note differing styles of constitutional adjudication 
and rules of statutory interpretation in various countries and specifically 
describe use of foreign law in seven jurisdictions. For the U.S., they assert 
that the American judiciary is ambivalent, but that there are some American 
judges who are openly hostile to using foreign law, especially Justice Antonin 
Scalia for originalist and political reasons.  However, other justices such as 
Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg have referenced foreign practices in 
their decisions.   
The authors also discuss when judges should use foreign law.  Judges 
may need to discover "common principles of law."   Harmonization of legal 
responses to common problems arising in many countries may provide 
desirable uniformity and predictability.  Foreign law may help fill a gap in, 
clarify an ambiguity in, or update local law, especially when one nation has 
modeled a statute on another nation's law or on an international legal 
instrument.  A country that has adopted a particular rule may provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of such a rule. 
Markesinis and Fedtke cover obstacles with using foreign law.  These 
include cultural differences; lack of time; lack of expertise and research 
support; lack of materials in a judge's own language; uncertainty concerning 
currency of information; inability to have in-depth instead of cursory 
examination of foreign law; lack of knowledge of the broader legal 
system/background; societal norms devaluing foreign ideas and experiences; 
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disinclination to adopt changes; and fear of adding uncertainty to the legal 
process. They also devote a chapter to "mental disposition" of judges as 
preventing them from using foreign law.  According to the authors, this is a 
novel topic that needs more research.  A judge might have misconceptions 
about foreign law acquired from law school, might be predisposed not to like 
foreign ideas, values, or practices, might fear the press/media or think that to 
reveal an idea as foreign might kill it, so a judge might conceal the source of 
inspiration.  Judges' morality, religious beliefs, and political leanings could 
affect their "receptivity to foreign ideas."   
The six chapters by Markesinis and Fedtke are followed by 
contributions from constitutional and supreme court judges of South Africa 
(Laurie W. H. Ackermann), Israel (Aharon Barak), Germany (Brun-Otto 
Bryde), France (Guy Canivet), Sydney Kentridge (South Africa), European 
Court of Human Rights (Christos L. Rozakis), and the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (Kondrad Schiemann). These contributions reinforce 
the main themes Markesinis and Fedtke introduce.  The judges describe their 
own experiences and refer to specific cases that show the benefits of using 
foreign law.  Judge Bryde adds a discussion of the influence of international 
human rights law on the transnational constitutional interpretation and 
contends that his legal arguments use foreign law for more than just guidance 
or inspiration.  Judge Cavinet describes how French judges interact with the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.  Overall, 
the judges provide invaluable insiders' views on practical applications of 
foreign law in the trenches.  Some of the judges discuss what they consider in 
their decision-making, what types of research staffs they have, and how they 
use information about foreign law. 
In the conclusion, the authors try to identify "the real 'bug' that causes 
the American legal mind to 'crash' when it comes to consider the desirability 
of foreign law."  They think that the "bug" is "judicial review.”  They think 
that the political rightwing in America is articulating a hostile view of use of 
foreign law that might prevail in the future.  But the authors end on an 
optimistic note by hoping that Americans will see the light and welcome 
"cross-fertilisation from abroad." 
This book is somewhat flawed.  It has a Euro-centric ("us"), anti-
American ("them"), political slant that is jarring throughout.  The authors, 
jurists trained in continental Europe, have an outsider's view of the U.S. 
debates on the use of foreign law.  While they present the various sides of the 
debates, the book would have benefited from inclusion of direct contributions 
by U.S. judges favorable or hostile to using foreign law.  Notably, Justice 
Scalia is often cited for his originalist, anti-foreign law views, yet there is no 
chapter by Justice Scalia to respond directly to the authors' statements. 
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Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law includes a useful bibliography of 
related works, name and subject indexes, and a table of cases.  The main 
contribution to the literature by this book is the focus on the role of judges in 
promoting the use of foreign law and comparative methodology.  The authors 
include a novel chapter on the mental disposition of judges as impediments to 
their use of foreign law.  Unfortunately, this chapter seems a trifle under-
researched; the authors themselves note that it is an area meriting further 
study.   
Because use of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court has come 
under fire from vociferous and influential judges such as Scalia and Posner 
and has been the subject of proposed legislation, it is a hot topic.  This book 
places the issue in the fascinating context of how courts in other countries use 
foreign law.  It is not unique, but the contributions from judges from various 
legal systems distinguishes it.  It also includes a fairly thorough review of the 
pros and cons of using foreign law.  It only lacks the independent American 
voice to counter the European continental viewpoint.    This book is 
recommended for academic law libraries with strong foreign and international 
law collections.  
Lyonette Louis-Jacques 
Foreign and International Law Librarian and Lecturer in Law 
D’Angelo Law Library 
University of Chicago Law School 
Chicago, Illinois USA 
          
 
Walker & Walker’s English Legal System, 9th edition. By Richard Ward and 
Amanda Wragg. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xxiii, 
707. ISBN 0-40-695953-6. £25.99; US$49.95. 
 
This Ninth edition of Walker & Walker’s is effectively a different 
book from the Eighth, owing to the profound reform that so many aspects of 
the English legal system have undergone since 1998, when the Eighth 
appeared.  The text exhibits deep revision, not merely ad hoc emendation, 
reflecting both internal reforms (to legal services, the tribunals, and civil 
procedure) and external exigencies (viz. compliance with the European 
Union’s Convention on Human Rights).  Legislative accretions both in the 
U.K. (such as the 1998 Human Rights Act) and the E.U. are also detailed.  
Moreover, the chapters dealing with the courts and the criminal justice system 
bear almost no relation to their predecessors.   
   In its conception, Walker & Walker’s English Legal System was 
meant for law students, and it remains a “student” work to this day; but that 
has never been its real scope.  Practitioners in England and Wales, foreign 
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lawyers (including those in Scotland and Northern Ireland, whose legal 
systems diverge somewhat), translators, social scientists, and journalists all 
have benefited from consulting this comprehensive work.  Additionally, no 
other survey of the English legal system covers the administration of justice 
as well as Walker & Walker’s does; it is almost a primer on the structure and 
function of the police and the courts. 
 The authors are members of the Law faculty of De Montfort 
University, Leicester.  This book is, once again, indispensable for any library 
hoping to provide a one-volume reference for the English legal system.   
      
Scott Rasmussen* 
Sausalito, CA USA 
 
 
Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? (For and Against Series). By Christopher 
Wellman and John Simmons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Pp. xiii, 200. ISBN 0-521-83097-4. £30.00; US$50.00.  
 
The issue essayed in this installment of the publisher’s For and 
Against series is an enduring one in political philosophy, undoubtedly because 
it is quite difficult and yet fundamental to the legitimacy of legal regimes and 
state sovereignties.  Yet posed as it is here in clear-cut, binary terms, the 
question facilitates no clear answer.  It turns out that neither respondent can 
avoid construing the question (or rather, tacitly revising it) to suit his 
response.  Wellman, a professor of philosophy who argues the affirmative, 
accordingly appears to be responding to something like, “Is there ever a duty 
to obey the law?”  Along these lines, he explains that “at no point have I 
meant to suggest that we invariably have an absolute moral duty to obey the 
law.  On the contrary, I seek to show only that there is a prima facie 
obligation to obey the just laws of a legitimate regime.” (p. 52-53)   
Meanwhile, Simmons, a professor of philosophy and law, argues the negative 
as if he were responding to the query, “Is there always a duty to obey the 
law?”  Indeed, the culminating sentence of his contribution is, “For most 
persons in most contemporary states, the answer to the question . . . is ‘no’.” 
(p. 196) In any event, such a framing of the debate certainly has the virtue of 
representing the issue in more realistic, nuanced terms than the title invites—
yes, a duty to obey can be identified under certain conditions, but no, we 
won’t find one in every circumstance—but at the expense of flagging the 
spirit of contest in which debate is ordinarily undertaken. 
                                                 
* Mr. Rasmussen is a legal editor and translator. 
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If this were a contest, Professor Simmons would immediately enjoy 
two clear advantages:  he effectively has the last word, inasmuch as his 
contribution is the second of the book’s two parts, and he has the easier task 
of arguing against the existence of a hook into concrete reality of a 
metaphysical concept.  (On the other hand, readers of Professor Wellman’s 
contribution are probably more likely to acknowledge a gut-level inclination 
for his conclusion.)  The latter of Simmons’ advantages plays out in the 
shifting burdens of the debate.  If Wellman’s sense of urgency regarding a 
moral duty to obey the law is prompted by an explicit assumption that chaos 
would ensue in the absence of our respect for the necessity of the state and of 
a concomitant obligation to obey its legal rules, then Simmons can almost 
effortlessly parry by simply denying Wellman’s premise and demanding 
proof.  Of course, Simmons does not resort to such a blunt response, but he 
does not altogether reject it, either.  Moreover, since the book is obviously 
only superficially organized as a contest, it in fact achieves its more important 
objective of introducing the reader to the winding avenues and prominent 
landmarks of its philosophical territory. 
Wellman’s position relies on the principle of “samaritanism” to 
inform his justification of a commitment to a duty to obey the law.  
Samaritanism, which he describes as “a standard component of commonsense 
morality” (p. 23), consists of the third of three strict conditions under which 
acceptance and compliance with coercive enforcement of obligations by the 
state is proper:  “(1) political states supply crucial benefits, (2) these benefits 
would be unavailable in the absence of political states, and (3) states can 
render their services without imposing unreasonable costs upon those they 
coerce.” (p. 5-6) Samaritanism, then, is the principle that imposes a duty to act 
when the costs of action are reasonable as compared either to the resulting 
benefits or to the resources available to the obligated actor.  Wellman 
emphasizes that even a highly valuable benefit—such as saving a person’s 
life—does not justify a less costly action, if the cost of that action to 
another—such as the coerced removal of a limb—is excessive.  The 
consequence of the samaritan principle is that a state that satisfies the first two 
conditions respecting provision of benefits need not achieve the voluntary 
buy-in of its citizens to justify its imposition of reasonable costs on them.  Put 
another way, the state may legitimately force its citizens to comply, because a 
necessary benefit it supplies is rescue of all citizens from the peril of stateless 
chaos at a reasonable cost demanded of each citizen. 
After establishing the need for a state obligated to protect its citizens 
and with power to impose reasonable duties (such as costs, actions, or 
prohibitions) on them, Wellman explains the reciprocal duty of the citizen to 
obey these commands.  This duty is a function of fairness, the obligation of 
each citizen to do his or her fair share to promote justice.  As such, Wellman 
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seeks to characterize the duty to obey as a Natural Duty, and therefore a duty 
contingent neither on a person’s social station nor on transactional 
undertakings entailing the person’s voluntary assumption of the duty. 
Having prepared this foundation for a duty to obey, Wellman sets 
about delineating the particular configurations of states and laws in which the 
duty is triggered.  Laws are either just or unjust, and states legitimate or 
illegitimate.  Of the four possible pairs of laws and states, then, Wellman 
gives particular attention to two—an unjust law of a legitimate state and a just 
law of an illegitimate state.  For example, he examines as instances of the 
former pair mandatory voting and military service laws, finding both of them 
wanting in terms of the three conditions permitting states to coerce its citizens 
and their duty to contribute fairly to the promotion of justice.  The upshot is 
that neither of these two configurations of state and law triggers the duty.  A 
fortiori, nor does the combination of an unjust law in an illegitimate state, 
leaving only just laws in legitimate states as properly demanding obedience.  
Furthermore, he acknowledges special circumstances in which just laws 
enforced by legitimate states would not require obedience.  Even arguing for 
the existence of a duty to obey the law, then, Wellman takes a carefully 
parsimonious view of the duty.  Where the duty arises, it is a function of both 
necessity and a particular species of efficiency, i.e., reasonable cost. 
For his part, Simmons opens by making a critical distinction that is 
not entirely clear in Wellman’s contribution.  By distinguishing a legal 
obligation to obey the law from an independent, general moral obligation to 
do so, Simmons sets the stage for his negative and affirmative arguments 
against the duty.  Like Wellman, Simmons briefly dispenses with the 
associative and transactional theories of the duty to obey the law, and focuses 
primarily on Natural Duty theories.  He examines varieties of these theories—
consequentialist and necessity accounts, and Kantian accounts deploying 
notions of respect and justice—and is in no case persuaded that any of these 
solidly ground a moral duty to obey the law.  Among his foremost reasons for 
discarding these accounts is his observation that there are often independent 
moral grounds for behaving as the law requires.  As his opening distinction 
helps to make clear, such grounds are not the same as an independent, general 
moral obligation to obey the law.  
Another significant area in which the distinction plays a part has to do 
with what Simmons calls “particularity” (p. 166 et seq.), a problem arising out 
of attempts to secure the duty according to theories of Natural Duty.  Simply 
put, Natural Duty theories are sweeping and general in application, but legal 
regimes are territorial and particularized.  A natural duty to promote justice, 
then, ought to require compliance with the laws of all possible just regimes, 
and not merely those of the country in which one happens to be a citizen.  
Such a sweeping requirement would plainly be impossible to satisfy.  Thus, 
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the particularity problem holds that “A general moral duty to promote 
justice—or any other impartial value—cannot bind one specially to support or 
comply with one particular state or society….” (p. 166) 
In his critique of Professor Jeremy Waldron’s attempt to resolve the 
particularity problem, Simmons perhaps needlessly complicates his attack on 
the moral duty to obey the law.  He argues that Waldron’s Kantian basis of 
justification of the state as a source of law to which obedience is due—the 
inescapable proximity of citizens residing within the territory of the state and 
the ensuing threat citizens impose upon each other—is outmoded:  “[T]he 
idea that we are special threats to those who are near us . . . seems both 
inherently implausible and a bit dated.” (p. 174)  He counters with the 
observation that we in fact depend on those to whom we live the closest, such 
as our families, and that we are, these days at least, more vulnerable to threats 
from remote sources than from local ones. 
In two respects, this criticism goes too far in its attack on the notion 
of a pre-political state of nature in which humans are mutually threatening.  
First, Simmons’ argument makes an empirical claim about the relative 
degrees of harmfulness of local compatriots and residents of remote countries, 
a claim that is simply hard to accept in the face of what we know about 
perpetrators of violent crimes and their typically close relationships to their 
victims.  We may indeed at present perceive an expanding global scope of 
terrorism, but it has no bearing on the realities of, for example, pervasive 
domestic violence (from which, ironically, the state has been notoriously 
reluctant to protect many women).  Second, his claim would as easily bolster 
as refute an argument based on a depiction of the ubiquity and severity of pre-
political threats warded off by state coercion in the form of law and its 
enforcement.  If neighbors are generally civil toward one another, one reason 
may very well be that their respect for social norms of civility has been 
fortified by the state’s effective threat of legal sanctions against incivility, 
crime, and violence.  Simmons need not go so far, because it is the positing of 
a natural propensity to threaten and to cause harm among people living in 
proximity—Wellman’s and Waldron’s assumption of a genuine threat of peril 
absent the state’s protection and coordination—that is arguably dubious, and 
at the very least merely hypothetical.  Simmons recognizes as much when he 
writes, “Even in a pure, apolitical state of nature…it would often be true that 
particular persons (those, say, who were nonviolent, sociable, or squeamish) 
simply could not be said to be threats to others.”  
(p. 175) 
The consequences of noncompliance comprise still another theme 
broached by the authors.  Both acknowledge that realistically it is difficult to 
argue that marginal occurrences of violations of many laws have any 
significant effect on the rights or welfare of others, or on the promotion of 
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justice in general.  For Simmons, this circumstance is sufficient to dispense 
with the notion that a moral obligation to comply with the law is necessary to 
the maintenance of a system of justice.  The system’s secure operation simply 
does not depend on absolute compliance, and an individual who disobeys a 
law may nevertheless thereby or in other ways contribute to the support of the 
system.  Although Wellman agrees that “there would likely be no discernible 
consequence if a typical citizen . . . contributed to her own state in some 
fashion other than obedience to its laws” (p. 45), he states two concerns that 
put pressure on this assumption and lead him to his conclusion favoring a duty 
to obey a just law.  First, by disregarding the law, a citizen fails to do her “fair 
share of helping to rescue others from peril.” (p. 45).  Second, disobedience of 
even an unjust law “also undercuts the authority of the entire system of which 
that law is a part.” (p. 83) These concerns are perhaps related to the necessary 
coordinating function of the state on which Wellman’s justification of the 
state depends.  Even though a marginal violation generates “no discernible 
consequence,” the integrity of the coordinating function may be at least 
marginally threatened. 
 Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? is a succinct, clearly written 
introductory treatment of a complex subject.  Each contributor marshals 
evidence and arguments from his own and others’ work and expertise.  In 
sum, for Wellman, there is such a duty, albeit a narrowly circumscribed one.  
For Simmons, all arguments in favor of the duty are fatally flawed in one or 
another respect.  Yet despite the work’s adversarial posture, the authors 
ultimately appear to concur, at least to the extent that they agree that any 
answer to the question posed must in fact be “It depends.” 
 
Dean C. Rowan 
Reference Librarian 
Boalt Hall School of Law 
Berkeley, CA USA 
 
 
India and International Law. Edited By Bimal N. Patel. Leiden, The 
Netherlands; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. Pp. xii, 379. ISBN 
90-04-14519-2. €125.00; US$179.00 
 
 The commitment of the state of India to the progressive development 
and codification of international law is estimable and has long been deserving 
of a comprehensive and detailed examination. Indian efforts in the fields of 
intellectual property rights, trade, and environmental law have been 
instrumental in refocusing international debate in these fields to include the 
voices of the developing world. Thus, given these important contributions, the 
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publication of India and International Law is a welcome addition to the scant 
body of literature on state practice in the field of international law.  
 Editor Bimal N. Patel has collected 14 essays that offer a thorough 
and diverse overview of the Indian approach to international law. Notable 
contributions include Subhash C. Kashyap’s essay, The Constitution of India 
and International Law, which examines provisions of the Indian constitution 
in light of fundamental international law principles. Indeed, the Indian 
constitution was created nearly contemporaneously with the creation of the 
United Nations and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and its provisions incorporate important human rights concepts from 
the Declaration as well as fundamental U.N. Charter principles such as the 
promotion of international peace and adherence to international norms and 
treaty obligations.  V.G. Hegde’s contribution, India and the International 
Patent System, looks at India’s unique perspective on the international patent 
system and its relationship to the developmental and technological needs of 
developing countries. Hegde points out that while the Indian system grants 
exclusive patent rights to individuals and corporations, it also create duties 
and obligations for their owners with regard to diffusion of technology and 
the promotion of social and economic welfare. 
Subsequent essays on topics such as trade in services and the WTO, 
international environmental law, the law of outer space, and international 
commercial arbitration further elaborate the warp and woof of Indian 
international law practice. The collection also includes three appendices: a 
chart detailing India’s positions on multilateral treaties deposited with the 
U.N. Secretary-General, a table outlining human rights provisions in UN 
instruments as memorialized in the laws and constitution of India and a list of 
Indian cases dealing with environmental matters. Unfortunately, the work 
lacks an index which would have been a useful addition given its wide-
ranging scope. Nonetheless, India and International Law remains a worthy 
contribution to the literature of state practice in the field of international law 
and is highly recommended as a new acquisition for any comprehensive 
collection of international and comparative law materials. 
 
Herb Somers 
Foreign/International Law Librarian 
Jacob Burns Law Library 
The George Washington University Law School 
Washington, D.C. USA 
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Heritage Law in Australia. By Graeme Boer. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. Pp.352. ISBN: 0-19-551641-9. £34.95; US$55.00; 
AUD$99.95. 
 
 Australia is the driest inhabited continent (only 6% is arable land), but 
it is also home to over one million species (many being endemic) and sixteen 
World Heritage List sites.  Perhaps it is not then surprising that Australia has, 
spread across its international obligations and three levels of government, a 
diverse range of laws to manage both its environmental and cultural heritage. 
 To produce their work Heritage Law in Australia, Professor Ben Boer 
and Graeme Wiffen surveyed Australia’s heritage laws at the international, 
national, and state/territory levels.  Boer and Wiffen describe heritage law as 
part of environmental law, but consider that the “present cultural environment 
and the present natural environment comprise the heritage of humankind.”  
Therefore, heritage law encompasses both the tangible and the intangible.  To 
cover this vast topic Heritage Law in Australia is divided into six parts and 10 
chapters.  Its stated aim is to provide a survey of Australian heritage law and 
to put such laws in the context of historical development and political debates.  
Its size (334 pages) and frequent use of headings make this extensive topic 
seem not only approachable but also comprehensible. 
 Both Boer and Wiffen are well-qualified to write about heritage law.  
Professor Boer is the Professor of Environmental Law at Sydney University, 
and Graeme Wiffen is a Senior Lecturer with Macquarie University.  
Professor Boer has an extensive academic background focusing on 
environmental and international law, while Mr. Wiffen has experience as a 
government lawyer and an interest in consumer protection.  Thus, Boer and 
Wiffen are able to bring to the task of surveying heritage law both academic 
rigor and experience with government legislative development. 
 Previously, Boer and Wiffen have contributed chapters, respectively, 
to the legal encyclopedias The Laws of Australia (Thompson Legal 
Publishers) and Halsburys’ Laws of Australia (Butterworths).  The succinct 
dispassionate writing and detailed footnoting required for a legal encyclopedia 
is evident in Heritage Law in Australia, and while this at times makes the 
subject matter appear dry and forgoes extensive analysis of the law, it does 
allow for a voluminous amount of material to be clearly and accurately 
conveyed to the reader.  Further, the detailed footnotes, extensive 
bibliography, and tables of cases and statutes would assist any reader wanting 
to undertake further research. 
 Additionally, Oxford University Press has established a website to 
support the book’s referencing system.  The website is intended to provide 
links to relevant laws and treaties and to update readers of developments in 
the field.  Unfortunately the website noted in the book is inaccurate, but the 
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correct website is easily located, and the site contains links to several relevant 
websites and flowcharts that detail the process for listing sites on heritage 
registers.  While the site does not yet highlight legislative developments, such 
as the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic), it is possible this feature will be 
added in the near future. 
 Boer and Wiffen’s first chapter, and the only chapter in Part 1, The 
Content and Context of Heritage Law, provides a brief but crucial context for 
understanding their definition of heritage law and the pressures and processes 
that have shaped the current legal regime.  As Boer and Wiffen describe, “it is 
important for legal frameworks concerning the nature of Australian identity 
and heritage to be drafted in ways that permit diversity in what should or need 
not be conserved, as well as allowing a sufficiently broad range of 
participation in making such decisions.”  Boer and Wiffen’s introduction 
provides an overview of the framework surrounding Australia’s heritage law 
and discusses heritage law’s role in environmental law and the link between 
heritage and national identity.  The dispassionate writing of Boer and Wiffin 
in Part I does fail to alert the reader sufficiently to the tumultuous and divisive 
nature of some debates surrounding Australia’s heritage in the manner of 
more descriptive works such as Phillip Toyne’s The Reluctant Nation: 
Environment, Law and Politics in Australia’ ABC Books, Sydney 2001.  This 
is a minor criticism, however, in light of the benefit of covering so many 
detailed issues in a succinct thirty-two pages. 
 Part II addresses international heritage law by focusing on the 
relevant international agreements, and includes overviews of applicable 
international bodies and charters.  The World Heritage Convention, which 
protects both natural and cultural heritage, is addressed in its own chapter 
(Chapter 3).  Not only is Australia home to several World Heritage Sites, but 
protection of these sites has given rise to extensive debate regarding state’s 
rights.  In the words of Boer and Wiffen, the World Heritage Convention “has 
become a vital feature of the environmental debate in Australia, featuring in 
several federal election campaigns and generating a range of significant cases 
in the High Court and Federal Court.”  The extent of Australia’s biological 
and cultural diversity ensures that Australia has a strong interest in the 
international protection of such diversity.  Implementation of such 
international agreements, however, must occur across both the federal 
jurisdiction, which negotiates and signs the agreements, and state/territory 
jurisdictions, which traditionally do not participate in the negotiation of 
international agreements.  The tension between the two jurisdictional levels is 
addressed in parts III (Commonwealth Heritage Law) and IV (State and 
Territory Heritage Law) of Heritage Law in Australia. 
 Part III addresses Australia’s heritage law at the federal (or 
Commonwealth) level including Australia’s international obligations. This 
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valuable section explains the role of the Constitution in Australia’s heritage 
laws and the power of international conventions to impact on Australia’s 
domestic law.  At the federal level Australia has the Environmental Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).  Boer and Wiffen detail this 
Act in Chapter 4 as well as the “listing” procedures for places to be included 
onto one of the two heritage “lists” created by the Act. 
 A particular strength of Boer and Wiffen is their meticulous research, 
and this is certainly evident in Chapter 7 (Heritage Acts in the States and 
Territories).  Boer and Wiffen have not simply reviewed the legislation of one 
or two of Australia’s more populous states, but have surveyed all five states 
and two territories and drawn comparisons between the various pieces of 
heritage legislation and processes operating in each jurisdiction. 
 Part V of Heritage Law in Australia addresses the laws covering 
Indigenous heritage. Again Boer and Wiffen have clearly and carefully 
addressed all relevant legislation and processes at both the federal and 
state/territory levels, including the establishment of the innovative obligation 
imposed by the Queensland legislation of a “cultural heritage duty of care” in 
relation to activities that may harm Indigenous cultural heritage. 
 Boer and Wiffen conclude that protection of Indigenous heritage, like 
all Australian heritage law, would benefit from a greater level of consistency 
and a commitment to a national approach.  While they acknowledge that the 
implementation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (Cth) at the federal level has improved consistency at the federal 
level, they still argue strongly for improved consistency across the states and 
territories and between the federal and state/territories levels.  In particular 
they argue for stronger links between Australia’s international obligations 
derived from international agreements and state/territory legislation as well as 
greater consistency with the philosophical approaches and meanings of 
heritage across state/territory legislation. 
 Overall this book is strongly recommended as a valuable reference 
text on heritage law.  Its clarity and conciseness are useful for practitioners, 
and its detailed reference support is an excellent starting point for further 
research. 
Lisa J. White 
Foreign Law Specialist 
Directorate of Legal Research 
Law Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. USA
